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A LITTLE STORY ABOUT METANARRATIVES:
LYOTARD, RELIGION, AND POSTMODERNISM
REVISTED
James K. A. Smith

Christian scholars, when challenged by the pluriform phenomenon of
"postmodernism," quickly seized upon Jean-Francois Lyotard's 'definition'
in the Introduction to The Pos/modern Condition: "Simplifying to the
extreme," Lyotard begins, "I define postmodcrn ,IS incredulity toward met,lnarratives [grand re~itsl." If this is the case, the question is raised: how can
Christian faith, grounded in the "meta narrative" of the biblical canon, be
viable in postmodernity? But is the biblical story or Christian faith a metanarrative? For Lyotard, the term "metanarrative" does not simply refer to a
"grand story" in the sense of stories which have grand or universal pretensions, or even make universal claims. What is at stake is the nature of those
claims. Given this more precise definition of metanarratives, I will argue
that the biblical story is not a metanarrati\'e in Lyotard's sense. Ha\'ing
noted this, the final portion of the article turns to a more positive understanding of the relation between biblical faith and Lyotard in particular,
and postmodernism in general.

The preoccupation with "the present"-our contemporaneity-which
characterizes current philosophical discourse is not particularly new,
though it is certainly a modem project whose origin is Kantian. Indeed,
the posing of the question, "What is Enlightenment?,"! raised the tone of
philosophy' to reflection on the present as a critical interrogation of "our
time" and its significance: the question of what is happening, now. More
than just an attempt to situate the present in relation to its past and future,
Kant's question probes the meaning of the present and what it means to be
"us"-to be here, now, contemporary. Arguing that Kant's essay "introduces a new type of question into the field of philosophical reflection,"
Foucault remarks that "with this text on the Aufkliinmg we see philosophy-and I don't think I'm exaggerating when I say that it is for the first
time-problematizing its own discursive contemporaneity.'" In modernity, philosophy has redoubled itself insofar as it has put modernity into
question; in other words, this critical philosophy could be characterized as
"the discourse of modernity on modernity."" Originating with modernity,
the question of who we are becomes a question of our present, our "now."
While "we postmoderns" may have abandoned any "idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view," our preoccupation with
naming the present betrays our modern filiation and Enlightenment
genealogy. While this original philosophical reflection on the present,
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encapsulated in the query "What is Enlightenment?" is, in our present, formulated as a different query-"Wllat is postmodernism?"5-the questioning itself is modem. And so, to "we postmodems," I might pronounce:
"My fellow postmodems, there are no postmodems," insofar as our penchant to describe our present--even as rupture-is indicative of a modem
project."
We might understand Jean-Fran<;:ois Lyotard's own project in his The
Post modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge within this Kantian tradition of
naming the present. Faced with the question, Lyotard picked up the
gauntlet and tackled the challenge early on: "Simplifying to the extreme,"
he remarks, "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives
lcs-rand re~its]."7 And for various reasons,' his answer has been quickly
adopted as a succinct formulation of our present condition, particularly by
scholars operating within the Christian tradition. Christian scholars (particularly those within the evangelical tradition), when challenged by the pluriform phenomenon of postmodernism, quickly seized upon Lyotard's
'definition' and thus consider the challenge of postmodernism in terms of
Lyotard's definition and the viability of metanarratives." Richard
Middleton and Brian Walsh, for instance, devote two chapters of their
important and original book, Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be, to the
question of how biblical faith, which they understand to be grounded in a
metanarrative, could be viable in postmodernity, which is characterized by
an incredulity toward metanarratives.lO A similar concern is expressed in
the work of Catholic theologian Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt who, in
contesting Lyotard's notion of the "end" of metanarratives, seeks to offer
"the possibility of a true (or real) metanarrative presentation (or presence)
of the sublime" as a viable theological alternative in a postmodern context. ll For both, the biblical story is a metanarrative; however, they argue
that it is not implicated in the violence of metanarratives-which they consider to be the concern of the postmodern critique-because it contains
within itself an "antitotalizing" and "ethical thrust" which undermines just
such totalization and violence. 12
But is the biblical story a "metanarrative?" Is the scriptural narrative a
"metanarrative" in the way that Lyotard speaks of the Hegelian system, or
Marx's historical materialism, or the modern scientific narrative of
progress? It is here that I think we would profit from carefully reading
Lyotard's analysis. For Lyotard, the term "metanarrative" l'Srand refit]
does not simply refer to a "grand story" in the sense of stories that have
grand or universal pretensions, or even make universal claims. What is at
stake is not the scope of these narratives but the nature of the claims they
make. For Lyotard, metanarratives are a distinctly modern phenomenon:
they are stories which not only tell a grand story (since even premodern
and tribal stories do this), but also claim to be able to legitimate the story
and its claims by an appeal to universal Reason. On Lyotard's account, the
Enuma Elish, though telling a story which is universal or grand in scope, is
nevertheless not a metanarrative because it does not claim to legitimate
itself by an appeal to scientific Reason. On the other hand, Lyotard sees
classical Marxism as a metanarrative insofar as it claims to be a system
legitimated by Reason, and therefore to be universally accepted on that
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basis. What is wrong with this is that such a modem grand reqit fails to see
that it, too, is grounded in a myth and faith-commitments.13 As a result,
postmodernity's "incredulity toward metanarratives" ought to be understood as an opportunity for religious thought in a contemporary contextan ally rather than a foe.
Given this more precise definition of metanarratives, I will argue (contra
Middleton and Walsh, and others) that the biblical story is not a metanarrative in Lyotard's sense. Yes, it makes grand, even universal claims (e.g.,
that every person is created in the image of God); but it does not-at least
within a broadly conceived" Augustinian" tradition-claim to be legitimated by Reason, but rather trusted in faith. To accomplish this, Part I will
catalogue and outline a number of engagements with postmodernism (and
Lyotard in particular) by Christian philosophers and theologians, in order
to point out a common misreading of Lyotard and hence a prevailing misconstrual of "our present:" viz., postmodernity. To attempt to correct this,
Part II will offer a close reading of Lyotard's argument in The PostmodcrJ1
Condition. Part III will then offer a re-reading of postmodernism as a
unique opportunity for religious thought in "our time."
I

Like "deconstruction,"14 the term "metanarrative" has become a word
which has never lacked employment, but has unfortunately been put to
work doing jobs it never asked for. In other words, the term "metanarrative" has been subject to equivocation and thus displaced from the very
specific context of Lyotard's employment of the concept. The result, it
seems, is a straw man.
We see this confusion, for instance, in Middleton and Walsh's discussion, where Lyotard's notion of a metanarrative is misconstrued in three
ways. First, concerning the very definition of "metanarratives:" after citing
Lyotard's definition of postmodernism as incredulity toward metanarratives, they go on to explain what they suggest are, "[f]rom a postmodern
perspective, [the] two central problems with metanarratives:" (a) that they
are "universal" stories, (b) that they are totalizing or marginalizing. 16 In
other words, they argue that the problem with metanarratives is their scope:
a metanarrative "purports to be not simply a local story (an ad hoc, firstorder account of a community'S experience) but the universal story of the
world from archc to telos, a grand narrative encompassing world history
from beginning to end."17 They then go on to suggest-even though they
concede Lyotard never says this"-that incredulity toward metanarratives
entails "widespread suspicion of any comprehensive metanarrative of
world history that makes 'total' claims" because such claims inevitably
lead to violence. 19 The problem with this explanation of metanarratives
(and hence postmodernism) is that it lacks any grounding in Lyotard's discussion of metanarratives, and thus seriously misconstrues what "postmodernism" would be. As we will see in Part II, the problem with metanarratives has nothing to do with the scope of their claims-that they are
"large-scale" stories of "universal scope""l-but the nature of their legitima-

tion.
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Second, in Middleton and Walsh the term "metanarrative" is conflated
with other discourses concerning the "social construction" of meaning: "If
metanarratives are social constructions, then, like abstract ethical systems,
they are simply particular moral visions dressed up in the guise of universality."21 So on their accounting, what's wrong with metanarratives from a
posbnodern perspective is the fact that they are merely social constructions
masquerading as universal truths: local claims with universal pretensions.
"To the postmodern mind," they conclude, "metanarratives are mere
human constructs, fictive devices through which we impose an order on
history and make it subject to us (hence they may be termed "master" narratives)."22 However, once again they are importing something into the
notion of metanarrative which is absent from Lyotard's discussion, resulting in more bad press. 23
Third, as indicated above, Middleton and Walsh consider the second
major problem with metanarratives to be an ethical one: as universal narratives, metanarratives are hegemonic, violently excluding any who are "different" or reject the dominant story.24 While concerns with totalizing violence, marginalization, and oppression are certainly important aspects of
postmodern critique,25 it must again be noted that this is not something that
Lyotard advances with respect to metanarratives. We do well to recall (as
we will do below) that the Postmodern Condition is A Report on Knowledge
which thus revolves around the epistemological problem of legitimation or
justification.
However, given their reading of Lyotard, postmodernism, and metanarratives, Middleton and Walsh pose the problem as follows:
The problem, from a postmodern point of view, is that the Scriptures,
in which Christians claim to ground their faith and in which we will
seek answers to the worldview questions we have raised, constitute a
metanarrative that makes universal claims. [ ... J SO the question we
are confronted with ... is whether the Christian faith, rooted as it is in
a metanarrative of cosmic proportions, is subject to the postmodern
charge of totalizing violence. 26
As they note, this is to assume that Christian faith is grounded in a metanarrative: "The important question, then, would not be whether the
Christian faith is rooted in a metanarrative, but what sort of metanarrative
the Scriptures contain."27 My goal in this essay is to argue that whether
Christian faith is rooted in a metanarrative is precisely the important question. Because Middleton and Walsh have misunderstood the notion of
metanarrative, they end up conceding that the biblical story is a metanarratiVE', and thus pose the challenge of postmodernism in a way that is misleading, or at least, misguided. When we turn to a close analysis of The
Postmodcrn Condition, we must conclude that when we properly understand "metanarratives," the biblical narrative does not constitute a metanarrative and thus Christian faith is not subject to the postmodern critique
in the way that Middleton and Walsh suggest.
Middleton and Walsh are not alone in their rendering of postmodernism in general, or metanarratives in particular. While grounded in a
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much closer reading of Lyotard, in his Primer on Postmodernism Stanley
Grenz also misconstrues Lyotard's discussion by suggesting that postmodernism finds fault with the mere universality of "metanarratives." In other
words, Grenz also seems to think that it is the scope of metanarratives
which is the problem:
What makes our condition "postmodern" is not only that people no
longer cling to the myths of modernity. The postmodern outlook
entails the end of the appeal to any central legitimating myth whatsoever. Not only have all the reigning master narratives lost their credibility, but the idea of a grand narrative is itself no longer credible. [... J
Consequently, the postmodern outlook demands an attack on any
claimant to universality-it demands, in fact, a "war on totality."28
And if metanarratives are simply orienting stories with universal claims,
then it must be the case that the biblical narrative which grounds Christian
faith is also a metanarrative. As a resuit, we are put in a position of choosing between postmodernism-which, of course, is defined by "incredulity
toward metanarratives" -and Christian faith. Thus, like Middleton and
Walsh, Grenz concludes that Christian scholars must ultimately part ways
with the postmodern critique of metanarratives, though they might adopt
it to a certain extent:
To put this in another way, we might say that because of our faith in
Christ, we cannot totally affirm the central tenet of postmodernism as
defined by Lyotard-the rejection of the metanarrative. We may welcome Lyotard's conclusion when applied to the chief concern of his
analysis-namely, the scientific enterprise. [... J Contrary to the implications of Lyotard's thesis, we firmly believe that the local narratives
of the many human communities do fit together into a single grand
narrative, the story of humankind. [ ... J As Christians, we claim to
know what that gr~nd narrative is. 29
But isn't that trying to have our cake and eat it, too? To arbitrarily say that
the postmodem critique applies to Enlightenment or scientific claims but
not Christian claims by appealing to the fact that we believe the one and
not the other is to beg the question. Further, and more to my point here,
Grenz paints himself into a comer by failing to understand what really
constitutes a metanarrative.3 It seems we need to read Lyotard again (for
the first time).
By failing to appreciate Lyotard's very specific meaning of "metanarrative," Christian philosophers and theologians have created a phantom
problem which ultimately proposes a false dichotomy: either postmodemism or Christian faith. Invoking Luther's notion of thcologia crucis (versus theologia gloriae) Brian Ingraffia poses this bifurcation in the starkest of
terms: "The theology of the cross pronounces an either/or: either biblical
revelation or philosophical speculation. The same either/or must be proclaimed to the present age: either biblical theology or postmodern theory."31 While more nuanced in Grenz, Middleton and Walsh, the proposed
(l
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dichotomy remains operative precisely because of a misinterpretation of
Lyotard on postmodernism and metanarratives. As a corrective, we will
engage in a closer reading of the The Postmodern Condition in Part II.
II

In postmodernity, the rules of the game have changed. In particular,
changes have taken place" since the end of the nineteenth century" which
"have altered the game rules for science, literature, and the arts." In other
words, postmodernism is characterized by a shift in the criteria of knowledge; it is an epistemological matter.32 Lyotard sets the stage for his discussion by chronicling a conflict between "science" and "narratives": when
judged by the criteria of modern science, stories and narratives are little
more than "fables." When pushed, however, science must legitimate itself:
it must produce a "discourse of legitimation" which Lyotard simply calls
"philosophy." So before determining what "postmodern" would mean, he
first defines what he means by "modern": "I will use the term modern to
designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a meta discourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such
as the dialectics of Spirit [Hegel], the hermeneutics of meaning
[Schleiermacher?], the emancipation of the rational [Kant] or working subject [Marx], or the creation of wealth [Smith]."33 The question of the relation between modernity and postmodernity revolves around this issue of
"legitimation. "
The process of legitimation or justification must be thought within the
pragmatics of communication: Every discourse of legitimation is "sent" by
a "sender" to an "addressee." In order for there to be legitimation, there
must be a consensus between sender and addressee. But in order for this to
occur, sender and addressee must already agree upon the rules of the
game--must already have committed themselves to language and meanings which will be shared and agreed upon. Thus, while purporting to
legitimate or justify itself to another who does not agree, a discourse of
legitimation must presume an original consensus. So legitimation occurs
only for those who agree to play the game by the same rules. While not
exactly preaching to the choir, it is a matter of preaching to those who have
agreed to come to church. What this means, however, is that the great discourses of legitimation in, say, the Enlightenment, are in fact predicated
upon an agreed upon narrative which established the rules of the game.
In order to appreciate this infiltration of narrative into science, we need
to consider more closely Lyotard's account of what he describes as "narrative knowledge" and "scientific knowledge." As we have already noted,
this unfolds within a framework of language theory and an analysis of the
pragmatics of discourse. 3" Unpacking the triad of sender, message, and
addressee, and noting the consensus which is required for such communication to take place, Lyotard (pace Wittgenstein) refers to such shared pragmatics as "language games" in which the rules of the game are agreed
upon by those who choose to play. Of each game he notes: "their rules do
not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a
contract, explicit or not, between players."35 Further, these shared rules
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both require and produce a social bond; this is why "the question of the
social bond, insofar as it is a question, is itself a language game."36
With this methodological framework of language game pragmatics in
place, we can now consider the pragmatics of "narrative" knowledge as distinguished from the pragmatics of "scientific" knowledge-a distinction
between "myth" and "science"37 (or, I would suggest, "faith" and "reason").
"Narrative" knowledge (which Lyotard also refers to as "traditional"
knowledge, or what we might describe, given his categories, as premodern
knowledge) is grounded in the "custom" of a culture and, as such, does not
require legitimation. Lyotard links this to a kind of "tribal" paradigm in
which the homogeneity of "a people" (Valk), coupled with the "authority"
of a narrator, produces a kind of immediate auto-legitimation. "The narratives themselves have this authority," he notes. In a sense, "the people are
only that which actualizes the narratives."3S Legitimation is not demanded
but rather is implicit in the narrative itself as a story of the people.
In contrast to this auto-legitimation, modem scientific culture externalizes the problem of legitimation. The two pragmatic poles of sender and
addressee are distinguished, and the addressee demands of the sender justification for messages sent her way. I must now provide "proof."'"
However, the homogeneity of the premodern Valk has dissolved; therefore,
we have no immediate or previously agreed upon consensus; we do not all
share the same language game. As such, modem legitimation has recourse
to a universal criterion: Reason. It is this move which generates what
Lyotard famously describes as "metanarratives": appeals to criteria of
legitimation which are understood as standing outside any particular language game and thus guarantee "universal" truth.
And it is precisely here that we locate postmodernity's incredulity
toward metanarratives: they are just another language game, albeit masquerading as the game above all games. Or as Lyotard puts it, scientific
knowledge, which considered itself to be a triumph over narrative knowledge, covertly grounds itself in a narrative (i.e., an originary myth).4o In particular, Lyotard analyzes two modem "narratives of legitimation": first, the
humanistic metanarrative of emancipation (as found in Kant and Marx),
and second, the metanarrative concerning the life of the Spirit in German
Idealism."! But we can see this infusing of myth in knowledge as far back
as Plato, where "the new language game of science posed the problem of
its own legitimation at the very beginning."42 In Books VI and VII of the
Republic, for instance, the answer to the question of legitimation (here both
epistemological and sociopolitical) "comes in the form of a narrative--the
allegory of the cave, which recounts how and why men yearn for narratives and fail to recognize knowledge. Knowledge is thus founded on the
narrative of its own martyrdom."43 In a similar way, Lyotard argues, modem scientific knowledge, when called upon (by itself) to legitimate itself,
cannot help but appeal to narrative--this "return of the narrative in the
non-narrative" is "inevitable."""' Whenever science attempts to legitimate
itself, it is no longer scientific but narrative, appealing to an orienting myth
which is not susceptible to scientific legitimation."' Science demands of
itself the impossible: "the language game of science desires its statements
to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its
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own."46 The appeal to "Reason" as the criterion for what constitutes
knowledge is but one more language game among many, shaped by
founding beliefs or commitments which determine what constitutes
"knowledge" within the game; reason is grounded in myth.
"Metanarratives," then, are the term Lyotard ascribes to these false appeals
to universal, rational, scientific criteria-as though they were divorced
from any particular game and transcend all language games.
Here we must return to the question posed at the close of Part I: If postmodernity is "incredulity towards metanarratives," then would postmodernism signal a rejection of Christian faith insofar as it is based on the
"grand story" of the Scriptures? I think the answer is clearly negative,
since the biblical narrative and Christian faith does not claim to be legitimated by an appeal to a universal, autonomous Reason, but rather by an
appeal to faith (or, to translate, "myth" or "narrative"),'? Lyotard very
specifically defines metanarratives as universal discourses of legitimation
which mask their own particularity; or to put it another way, metanarratives deny their narrative ground even as they proceed upon on it as a
basis. In particular, we must note that the postmodern critique is not
aimed at metanarratives because they are really grounded in narratives; on
the contrary, the problem with metanarratives is that they do not own up
to their own mythic ground."" Postmodernism is not incredulity toward
narrative or myth; on the contrary, it unveils that all knowledge is grounded in such. Once we appreciate this, the (false) dichotomy which
Middleton and Walsh, Grenz, Ingraffia, and others propose is dissolved
insofar as the biblical narrative is not properly a "metanarrative." As a
result, new space is opened for a Christian appropriation of the postmodem critique of Enlightenment rationality.<9
What characterizes the postmodern condition, then, is not a rejection of
grand stories in terms of scope or the sense of epic claims, but rather an
unveiling of the fact that all knowledge is rooted in some narrative or myth.
ThE' result, of course (and here I note one of the genuine problems of postmodernity), is what Lyotard describes as a "problem of legitimation"Sl) (or
what Habermas describes as a "legitimation crisis") since what we thought
were universal criteria have been unveiled as just one game among many.5)
If we consider, for instance, the reality of deep mom I diversity and competing visions of the Good, postmodern society is at a loss to adjudicate the
competing claims. There can be no appeal to a higher court that would
transcend a historical context or language game, no neutral observer nor
'God's-eye-view' which can legitimate or justify one paradigm or moral language game above another. If all moral claims are conditioned by paradigms of historical commitment, then they cannot transcend those conditions; thus, every moral claim operates within a 'logic' that is conditioned
by the paradigm. Or, in other words, every language game has its own set
of rules. As a result, criteria which determine what constitutes 'evidence'
or 'proof' must be game-relative: they will function as rules only for those
who share the same paradigm or participate in the same language game.
Arguments or defenses of moral claims operate on the basis of intm-paradigm or intra-game criteria; as such, the arguments carry force only insofar
as the addressee shares the same paradigm; in this case there would be a
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consensus between the sender and addressee of a statement. If, however,
the sender of the argument and the addressee live in different language
games, then the argument is bound to be lost in the mai1." The incommensurability of language games means that there is a plurality of logics which
precludes any demonstrative appeal to a "common reason." Or again, in
the model of language games, the rules for distinct games are not proportiona!.'3 The pragmatics of justification, which requires a reversibility (i.e.,
consensus) between the sender and addressees, is precisely that which is
denied between language games. "[T]he problem," Lyotard notes, "is
indeed one of translation and translatability. It so happens that languages
are translatable, otherwise they are not languages; but language games are
not translatable, because if they were, they would not be language games"
(p. 53).54 Recognition of the incommensurability of language games means
that there is no consensus, no sensus communis. 55
In the face of this problem, we must not lose sight of the fact that what
constitutes the postmodern condition is precisely a plurality of language
games-a condition in which no 0111' story can claim either auto-legitimation (because of the plurality of "the people") nor appeal to a phantom universal "Reason" (because Reason is just one game among others, which is
itself rooted in a narrative)." And this plurality is based on the fact that
each game is grounded in different "narratives" or myths (i.e., founding
beliefs). Whether we understand this as a new Babel or a new Pentecost, I
shall argue in the final section that this situation-though posing a challenge-also presents a lmique opportunity for religious thought.
III

At root, I would argue that what is at stake in postmodemism is the relationship between faith and reason. When Lyotard describes postmodernism as
"incredulity toward metanarratives," he indicates a suspicion and critique
of the very idea of an autonomous Reason-a universal rationality without
commitments. Modernity's metanarratives cannot disengage themselves
from narratives as their ultimate ground, and thus cannot divorce themselves from "myth"--orienting beliefs which themselves are not subject to
rational legitimation. In this light, consider, for instance, Kuhn's analyses
concerning the role of paradigms in scientific research. Dominated by the
language of faith,57 Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions points out
the role of paradigms, as "constellations of belief,"5s in orienting how we
perceive our world and what we consider kn.owledge and truth. In other
words, science finds itself grounded in prior beliefs which do not admit of
legitimation, but rather function as the basis for further legitimation. The
paradigm itself is a "belief"-a matter of faith. It is also at this level that
Wittgenstein notes: "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply
what I do."'5g To this list we could add Gadamer, Polanyi, Derrida, and others;6ll common to all of them is a delimitation of rationality, particularly
Enlightenment ideals of scientific, objective rationality.
this sense, the postmodern critique described by Lyotard as
"incredulity toward metanarratives" represents a displacement of the

In
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notion of autonomous reason as itself a myth. b ! And that, it seems to me, is
a project with which Christian scholars ought to ally themselves, particularly once we have clarified that such an alliance does not require jettisoning the biblical narrative. By calling into question the idea of an
autonomous, objective, neutral rationality, I have argued that postmodernity represents the retrieval of a fundamentally Augustinian epistemology
which is attentive to the structural necessity of faith preceding reason,
believing in order to understand. 62 While this Augustinian structure is formalized-in the sense that there are a plurality of faiths, as many as there
are language games-the structure (of faith preceding reason) remains in
place, in contrast to modern (and perhaps even Thomistic63 ) epistemologies. The incredulity of postmodernity toward metanarratives is due to the
fact that modernity denies its own commitments, renounces its faith, while
at the same time never escaping it. Postmodernism refuses to believe the
Enlightenment is without a creed. But note: the postmodern critique does
not demand that modern thought relinquish its faith (a modern gesture to
be sure), but to own up to it-to openly confess its credo. Thus we might
consider the postmodern critique as a revaluing of myth, of orienting faith,
providing new spaces for religious discourse--and in particular, an integrally Christian philosophy-in a climate where it has been demonstrated
that everyone's "got religion."
How will this insight be helpful to Christian philosophers? My point is
not to suggest that Lyotard's analysis concretely helps us to understand
Christian faith; in other words, I am not arguing that we look to Lyotard
for assistance in helping us to understand Christian faith commitments.
Rather, 1 think that "Christian philosophers"-whose faith is an integral
aspect of their philosophy and their philosophizing64-should find in
Lyotard's critique of metanarratives and autonomous Reason an ally
wruch opens up the space for a radically Christian philosophy. By calling
into question the very ideal of a universal, autonomous Reason (which
was, in the Enlightenment, the basis for rejecting 'religious thought'), and
further demonstrating that all knowledge is grounded in "narrative" or
"myth," Lyotard relativizes (secular) philosophy's claim to autonomy, and
so grants the legitimacy of a philosophy which grounds itself in Christian
faith. Previously, such a distinctly "Christian philosophy" would have
been exiled from the "pure" arena of philosophy because of its "infection"
with bias and prejudice. Lyotard's critique, however, demonstrates that no
philosophy-indeed, no knowledge-is untainted by prejudice or faithcommitments. In this way the playing field is leveled and new opportunities to voice a Christian philosophy are created. So Lyotard's postmodern
critique of metanarratives, rather than being a formidable foe of Christian
faith and thought, can in fact be enlisted as an ally in the construction of a
Christian philosophy.65
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Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" in Oil History, ed. Lewis
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White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 3-10.
2. This is the focus of Derrida's gloss on Kant's "On a Newly Arisen
Superior Tone in Philosophy." See Jacques Derrida, "On a Newly Arisen
Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy," in Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays
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the end of some history?" See Lyotard, The Differend: Phrascs in Dispute, trans.
Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988),
pp. 135-136.
7. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiv.
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(1979) and English (1984), its deceiving simplicity, its appearance in the
Preface, and its largely epistemological definition of postmodernism. All of
these factors make it prime real estate for academic squatters who get there
first, don't have to read much, and find it "easy."
9. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard himself did not generate a critique
of Christianity as a metanarrative. Nor does he do so in his recent engagement
with Christianity in Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard and Eberhard Gruber, The Hyphen:
Between Judaism and Christianity, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas
(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999).
10. J. Richard Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth Is Stranger Than It Used
to Be: Biblical Faith ill a Postmodern Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
1995), chs. 4 and 5. In the structure of the book, these two chapters form the
fulcrum of the text (see the Table of Contents for a visual aid on this point). We
should note a careful distinction here: their contention is that the "the
Scriptures ... constitute meta narratives that makes universal claims;" and
Christian faith "is undeniably rooted in [this] metanarrative" (p. 83). I will not
contest that Christian faith is grounded in the Scriptures; the question is
whether the Scriptures really constitute a "metanarrative" in Lyotard's sense.
If not, then the so-called "problem" of "biblical faith in a postmodern age"
[Middleton and Walsh's subtitle] will not revolve around its alleged complicity
with metanarratives.
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Sublime," in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, eds. John Milbank, Catherine
Pickstock, and Graham Ward (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 204.
12. Middleton and Walsh, Truth is Stranger, pp. 87-107. This will be
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Grove,IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000).
14. Derrida discusses the fact that the word "deconstruction" is "already
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values" in his "Letter to a Japanese Friend," trans. David Wood and Andrew
Benjamin in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 270. "This word," he continues, "at least
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always be girded by an entire discourse" (p. 272).
] 5. Again, since such misunderstandings are so common with respect to
contemporary French philosophy, which we call "postmodern" (they do not), I
would again refer to Derrida's reception in the United States. Concerning the
caricature of his work in North America, at Villanova University (in 1994),
Derrida took the opportunity "to reject a commonplace, a prejudice, that is
widely circulated about deconstruction. That is, not only among bad journalists. and there are many of them, but among people in the academy who
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See "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation With Jacques Derrida," in
Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D.
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16. Middleton and Walsh, Truth Is Stranger, pp. 70-71.
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why Lyotard's definition would function as the fulcrum of their book.
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tive is to clarify a misreading of Lyotard and thus a common mislU1derstanding of postmodernism and its relationship to narratives. However, "postmodern ism" is by no means a monolithic phenomenon. As such, I can't fairly grapple with its many aspects in space provided here, but do hope to take up this
question elsewhere. Suffice it to say that Christians would have legitimate concerns about more "Nietzschean" strains (as in the work of Deleuze).
24. Ibid., pp. 71-73.
25. As evidenced, for instance, in the work of Levinas and Derrida's later
work. For a discussion of these matters, see my "Determined Violence:
Derrida's Structural Religion," Journal of Religion 78 (1998), pp. 197-212 and
"Alterity, Transcendence, and the Violence of the Concept" International
Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1998), pp. 369-381.
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27. Ibid., p. 84.
28. Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1996), p. 45.
29. Ibid., p. 164. Of particular concern here is Grenz's use of the word
"know" in the final sentence. How that is defined would be the crux of
whether the Christian narrative really is a metanarrative in Lyotard's sense.
30. Henry Knight also misunderstands Lyotard on this point, defining a
"metanarrative" as simply an "overarching explanatory story." See Henry H.
Knight III, A Future for Truth: Evangelical Theology in a Postmodern World
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), p. 58.
31. Brian Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and [it seems to me this conjlU1ction
should be a disjunction: or] Biblical Theology: Vanquishing God's Shadow
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 241 (cp. p. 14). While space
does not here permit a full critique, the naivete of Ingraffia's thesis and argument is frustrating. His book begins with a protest against the "synthesis" of
biblical theology and philosophy, which he traces to "the early Church fathers"
who "often used Greek conceptuality and philosophy to articulate their faith,"
and thus diluted biblical truths (p. 14)-as though Greek conceptuality was not
the framework for articulating biblical ideas in the New Testament itself!
Describing this synthesis as "ontotheology," Ingraffia (echoing Barth) proposes
to separate the two, distilling a purely biblical theology (is the New Testament
"theology"?). And lest we ignore Ingraffia's claims in this regard as lU1comman or insignificant in contemporary discourse, 1 would note that similar
appeals to "revelation" are heard in the work of Jean-Luc Marion. I hope to
take this up in another context, however.
32. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiii. He goes on to consider the
"computerization" of knowledge, indicating a condition wherein any knowledge which cannot be translated into "code" or reduced to "data" will be abandoned (p. 4). His analysis (in 1979, it should be noted) of the way in which
knowledge is transformed into "information" and commodified is both
insightful and instructive.
33. Ibid.
34. See especially ibid., pp. 9-11. Here Lyotard places his work within the
tradition of Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Morris.
35. Ibid., p. 10.
36. Ibid., p. 15.
37. We must note that when Lyotard speaks of "science" it must be lU1derstood in the broad sense of a "theoretical" discourse (Wissenschaft) not the nar-
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row North American sense of the natural sciences.
38. ibid., p. 23.
39. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
·to. "The state spends large amounts of money to enable science to pass
itself off as epic" (Ibid., p. 28).
·n. ibid., pp. 31-37.
·-12. Ibid., p. 28.
43. Ibid., pp. 28-29. Following Lyotard's lead, from the Republic alone we
could multiply ad infinitum examples of the way in which knowledge is
grounded in myth, or how the discourse of reality is presented in images, or
the way in which philosophy is grounded in religion (since the battle of philosophy and poetry, staged in the Republic, is really a battle between philosophy
and religion-or better, one religion and another).
44. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
,is. One can see, then, how logical positivism constituted the final naivete
of modernity: rejecting all that could not be legitimated until it recognized its
own collapse. (Incidentally, Lyotard applauds Wittgenstein for not falling into
thi~. positivist trap [Ibid., p. 41].)
46. Ibid., p. 28.
47. That said, I would however concede that some might argue that the
Christian faith can be legitimated by reason. Tn evangelical apologetic discussions, for instance, "classical" or "evidential" apologists (versus "presuppositionalists") might perhaps argue that Christian faith is grounded in reason, and
thus constitutes a metanarrative. Without rehearsing the history of debates
regarding apologetic method, I would argue that classical or evidential apologetics would fall prey to Lyotard's critique of metanarratives (since it consorts
with a notion of universal Reason), and that such a critique would be welcomed by presuppositionalists. One of the constructive engagements with
Lyotard would be to consider his discussion of language games and critique of
metanarratives and its correlation with presuppositional discourses on "worldviews" and critique of "autonomous Reason." For a nuanced discussion of the
latter, see Herman Dooyeweerd, III the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the
Pretended Autonomy of Philosophical Thought, ed. James K.A. Smith, Collected
Works, B/4 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999).
48. Again, as I noted earlier, I am using "myth" here in a benign way as
"orienting commitments" or "fundamental beliefs." It makes no evaluation
regarding the "truth" or "falsity" of such beliefs (which would be to understand such narratives precisely on a "scientific" register where "myth" is
opposed to "fact").
49. Grenz and Middleton and Walsh both note that Christian scholars can
participate in the postmodern critique of modernity, but then always add the
proviso that we can't go "all the way" with postmodernism because that
would entail critique of the biblical (meta)narrative. My point is to show that
such provisos are urmecessary because the biblical narrative is not a metanarrative. (That is not to say, of course, that the biblical narrative is immune from
critique, even postmodern critique. But the criterion will be ethical, not epistemological.)
SO. Ibid., p. 8.
S1. There is also a second sense in which "legitimation" is at issue here: not
only with respect to how metanarratives are legitimated, but also what is legitimated-which, all too often, is an oppressive status quo. Thus metanarratives
not only appeal to a universal Reason to legitimate themselves, they do so in
order to legitimate a present order. While this "ethical" concern is more developed by Lyotard elsewhere (in Just Gaming and The Diffcrend), it is not unrelat-
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ed to the epistemological critique of metanarratives in The Postmodern
Condition. In this respect, I think Middleton and Walsh are suggestive insofar
as they argue that the biblical story carries within itself an "antitotalizing
thrust" and an inherent "counterideological dimension" by which the biblical
story comes as a challenge and disruption to every society-"de-Iegitimizing"
our social practices. For a careful exposition of these elements within the biblical canon, see Middleton and Walsh, Truth Is Stranger, pp. 87-107. My thanks
to an anonymous referee for recalling this element of the question.
52. Cpo Derrida's analysis of these problema tics in "Envois" in La carte

postale.
53. See Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 22.
54. This point is contested by Rorty, who claims that while language games
are incommensurate, they are not "unlearnable"; or, in other words, Rorty's
position (and hope) is that no differend is apriori untranslatable-that every differend could be turned into a litigation (see Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without
emancipation: A response to Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard," in Essays on Heidegger and
Others [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 215-217). Apart
from an interpretive disagreement regarding Wittgenstein, I think Rorty also
misses Lyotard's careful distinction between "languages" and "language
games;" throughout this discussion, Rorty uses the two interchangeably.
Lyotard is emphasizing (in a better reading of Wittgenstein, I think) that to
change games is to change rules, and hence change criteria for evidence, etc.
55. Lyotard and Thebaud, Just Gaming, p. 14. In this context, I can only outline this ethico-political problem posed by postmodernity, since it is not central
to the argument of this paper. I have formulated a response to it in my "The
Limits of Paralogistics: Yahweh's Paganism and Lyotard's Body" [forthcoming]. For an instructive discussion of plurality and the challenge of pluralism,
see Richard J. Mouw and Sander Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons: An Essay in
Christian Public Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).
56. For Lyotard, justice is precisely recognizing and creating space for this
plurality, though not without limits. He describes this postmodern sense of
justice as "paganism," in contrast to the "piety" of those who think their (language) game is the only game in town, which usually results in "terror." These
themes are most systematically explored in Just Gaming. On the limits to this
paganism, on Lyotard's own register, see my "The Limits of Paralogistics."
57. For just a selective example of such passages from Thomas Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970), on "belief," see pp. 2, 4, 17, 43,113; on "commitments," see 4-5, 7, 11,4043; on "tradition," see pp. 6, 10,39,43.
58. Ibid., p. 175.
59. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Iwuestigations, trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe (New York: MacMillan, 1959), § 217.
60. For a discussion, see James K.A. Smith and Shane R. Cudney,
"Postmodern Freedom and the Growth of Fundamentalism: Was the Grand
Inquisitor Right?," Studies in Religion/Science Religieuses 25 (1996), pp. 41-44.
61. For an earlier Christian critique in this vein, see Herman Dooyeweerd,

In the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of
Philosophical Thought, Collected Works S/4, Ed. James K.A. Smith (Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999). For a discussion, see my introduction,
"Dooyeweerd's Critique of 'Pure' Reason," pp. v-xiii.
62. See my "The Art of Christian Atheism: Faith and Philosophy in Early
Heidegger," Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): 71-81, and "Is Deconstruction an
Augustinian Science?: Augustine, Derrida, and Caputo on the Commitments
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of Philosophy," in James H. Olthuis, ed., Religion Without Religion (New York:
Routledge, 2002), ch. 7.
63. That is, it seems to me that the notion of an autonomous reason is not
unique to the Enlightenment, but already can be located in Thomas' understanding of "natural reason." Thomas and Augustine disagree on this point, as
seen in Aquinas' commentary on Boethius' De trinitate, Q. 1, art. 1. My goal
here is not to mediate that debate, but to raise a question that demands further
consideration.
64. Not all that goes under the rubric of "Christian philosophy" operates
on the basis of an integral understanding of the relationship between faith and
philosophy wherein all philosophy proceeds from some faith commitments. As
I have argued in "The Art of Christian Atheism," much "Christian" philosophy
accepts the dogma regarding the autonomy of philosophical thought. It is the
rejection of such a dogma that characterizes what I am describing as an
"Augustinian" understanding of the relationship between faith and reason,
which concludes that there is no reason which is not grounded in at least a
faith. Permit me to again refer to Dooyeweerd, 111 the Twilight of Western
Thuught, chs. 1 and 2.
65. My thanks to Christopher Kaczor and an anonymous referee for their
helpful comments, and Bil Van Otterloo for his assistance.

